TESTIMONY-BY: SANDRA L. HYLAND, PH.D., SENIOR PRINCIPAL ENGINEER

AFFILIATION: BAE SYSTEMS

Statement of Sandra L. Hyland, Ph.D. Senior Principal Engineer BAE Systems

Committee on House Science and Technology Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation

February 3, 2010

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. My name is Sandra Hyland and I served as the study director for the 1996 NRC study Airline Passenger Security Screening: New Technologies and Implementation Issues as well as vice chair for the 2007 NRC study Assessment of Millimeter-Wave and Terahertz Technology for Detection and Identification of Concealed Explosives and Weapons (the form of imaging more commonly known as full-body scanners).

The NRC--National Research Council--is the operating arm of the National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine of the National Academies, chartered by Congress in 1863 to advise the government on matters of science and technology. I would like to clarify that I am not representing my employer, BAE Systems, but am here to discuss work I have done as an employee and a volunteer with the NRC over the past 16 years.

The FAA and, following the events of September 11, 2001, the TSA have sponsored numerous studies with the National Research Council in order to obtain expert, independent guidance on technology priorities and approaches, and we are pleased to continue this positive relationship. My testimony today will center on the earlier reports, and in particular, the committee's discussion related to the implementation issues associated with these technologies.

The 1996 NRC Report, Airline Passenger Security Screening: New Technologies and Implementation Issues, described not only the technical advances associated with security screening, but also the more practical side of that screening. It is important to understand that no technology, no matter how promising, will work unless it can be successfully implemented within the current aviation security infrastructure. To this end, in the 1996 report, the panel addressed both the legal issues associated with passenger screening most of which are related to the concepts of search, the expectation of privacy, and implied consent as well as the more-difficult-to-quantify issue of public acceptance.

Although this report was written prior to the events of September 11, 2001, and during a time when the internet was in its infancy and "blogosphere" was neither a word nor a concept, it is my opinion that the panel's underlying message that it is important to assess the public's reaction to, and acceptance of, the screening technologies is still relevant. Critical differences between the passenger screening approach of today compared to that in 1996 include the federalization of the screening workforce and the assumption by the U.S government of the security screening operations. Compared to the "arms-length" responsibility the FAA had for passenger screening in 1996, the TSA is now mostly directly responsible for the purchase, deployment, and operation of security screening equipment and for the security screening personnel. This change in the role of the U. S. government in passenger screening does not obviate the need for TSA to assess the public acceptance of a specific security screening approach to strike a balance between security and a robust air travel business.